http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=NaN&eid=914364&evid=1
1
People V. Hall
4 Cal. 399 (1854) (Opinion of Chief Justice Murray)
At issue was whether witnesses of Chinese origin were included in a statute that provided "No Black, or Mulatto Person, or Indian, shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a white man." In holding that the murder conviction of a white man had to be reversed because the witnesses were Chinese, Chief Justice Hugh C. Murray ruled that Chinese were obviously black, because they were not white, and that they were Indians too, because Indian races could be traced back to Mongolia, and Christopher Columbus mistakenly thought he was in China when he named the inhabitants of this continent Indians. The Chief Justice warned that if we let Chinese testify in our courts, the next thing we know they'll want to vote, serve as jurors or judges, or even run for the Legislature. He concluded by describing the Chinese as "a race of people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their history has shown."
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3
Estate of Fair
132 Cal. 523, 550?554 (1901) (Opinion of Justice Henshaw)
The fortune in real property that James G. Fair mined from the Comstock Lode was left in a will to his son and two daughters, and upon their death "to be transferred and conveyed," one-fourth to the descendants of each daughter, and one-half to Fair's brothers and sisters or their descendants. Fair's children challenged the will, arguing that it was invalid as a trust to convey real property, and that all the real property should go directly to them via intestate succession. They lost in a 43 decision that concluded the will vested an "equitable remainder" in Fair's siblings. But the court then granted a rehearing, and a year later reversed itself, 43. Justice Frederick W. Henshaw's concurring opinion explains his change of mind, but it leaves out one salient fact: his receipt of $410,000 in cash from the Fair children to get him to change his vote. The bribe was not revealed until 17 years later, when Henshaw resigned from the court after Fremont Older, publisher of the San Francisco Bulletin, confronted him with an affidavit of the bribe-giver. Henshaw admitted the charge, pleaded with Older not to publish the account, and agreed to leave the bench. A San Francisco property that Fair's daughter Tessie acquired by this well-placed bribe is currently the site of the Fairmont Hotel, which bears Fair's name. Henshaw died in 1929, leaving an estate of $338,000-not bad, on a salary of $6,000 per year.
1
People V. Hall
4 Cal. 399 (1854) (Opinion of Chief Justice Murray)
At issue was whether witnesses of Chinese origin were included in a statute that provided "No Black, or Mulatto Person, or Indian, shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a white man." In holding that the murder conviction of a white man had to be reversed because the witnesses were Chinese, Chief Justice Hugh C. Murray ruled that Chinese were obviously black, because they were not white, and that they were Indians too, because Indian races could be traced back to Mongolia, and Christopher Columbus mistakenly thought he was in China when he named the inhabitants of this continent Indians. The Chief Justice warned that if we let Chinese testify in our courts, the next thing we know they'll want to vote, serve as jurors or judges, or even run for the Legislature. He concluded by describing the Chinese as "a race of people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their history has shown."
==
3
Estate of Fair
132 Cal. 523, 550?554 (1901) (Opinion of Justice Henshaw)
The fortune in real property that James G. Fair mined from the Comstock Lode was left in a will to his son and two daughters, and upon their death "to be transferred and conveyed," one-fourth to the descendants of each daughter, and one-half to Fair's brothers and sisters or their descendants. Fair's children challenged the will, arguing that it was invalid as a trust to convey real property, and that all the real property should go directly to them via intestate succession. They lost in a 43 decision that concluded the will vested an "equitable remainder" in Fair's siblings. But the court then granted a rehearing, and a year later reversed itself, 43. Justice Frederick W. Henshaw's concurring opinion explains his change of mind, but it leaves out one salient fact: his receipt of $410,000 in cash from the Fair children to get him to change his vote. The bribe was not revealed until 17 years later, when Henshaw resigned from the court after Fremont Older, publisher of the San Francisco Bulletin, confronted him with an affidavit of the bribe-giver. Henshaw admitted the charge, pleaded with Older not to publish the account, and agreed to leave the bench. A San Francisco property that Fair's daughter Tessie acquired by this well-placed bribe is currently the site of the Fairmont Hotel, which bears Fair's name. Henshaw died in 1929, leaving an estate of $338,000-not bad, on a salary of $6,000 per year.
JONES AND MAYOR 1968
Easton v. Strassburger
The duty of the licensee to make a reasonable investigation of the property evolved from the case of Easton v. Strassburger (1984). As the leading case on this issue, the courts decision sent the message "loud and clear" to all real estate licensees that their responsibility does not stop at a mere disclosure of material facts known to the licensee. Easton filed suit against Strassburger, the real estate agency and others for fraudulent concealment and intentional misrepresentation regarding potential soil problems and a resulting slide on the property.
Will 隨意[estate at will] or 遺囑
interest 利息 [in loan related] or 利益 /股份 (ownership)
improvement加建(築) = building
security (not 保安) but 抵押( collateral / hypothecation)
Easton v. Strassburger
The duty of the licensee to make a reasonable investigation of the property evolved from the case of Easton v. Strassburger (1984). As the leading case on this issue, the courts decision sent the message "loud and clear" to all real estate licensees that their responsibility does not stop at a mere disclosure of material facts known to the licensee. Easton filed suit against Strassburger, the real estate agency and others for fraudulent concealment and intentional misrepresentation regarding potential soil problems and a resulting slide on the property.
Will 隨意[estate at will] or 遺囑
interest 利息 [in loan related] or 利益 /股份 (ownership)
improvement加建(築) = building
security (not 保安) but 抵押( collateral / hypothecation)
RESPA
RESPA - no kickback, HUD-1
http://www.escrowhelp.com/articles/20000915.html
and
Z - APR
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_in_Lending_Act
Purpose of the time-essence provision
The “common understanding” said to exist as the purpose for including a time-essence clause in a purchase agreement is to protect the seller from delays in the buyer’s payment of the sales price. Delays “tie up” both the seller’s ownership of the real estate and receipt of the net sales proceeds beyond the date or period fixed for the transfer of ownership
.
The “common understanding” said to exist as the purpose for including a time-essence clause in a purchase agreement is to protect the seller from delays in the buyer’s payment of the sales price. Delays “tie up” both the seller’s ownership of the real estate and receipt of the net sales proceeds beyond the date or period fixed for the transfer of ownership
.
Severing a right-of-survivorship vesting
A husband and wife are the vested owners of a parcel of real estate which is community property. The vesting provides for the right of survivorship under either a community property with right of survivorship or joint tenancy vesting.
Shortly before her death, the wife is advised the vesting with its right of survivorship means her interest in the property will automatically pass to her husband on her death. The wife wishes to distribute her interest in the property to others by her will. To do so, the wife must terminate the right of survivorship by severing the community property with right of survivorship or joint tenancy vesting. Remember, the property retains its community property status after the severance deed is recorded.
To sever the vesting, the wife prepares and signs a deed from herself “as a joint tenant” or “as community property with right of survivorship,” whichever is applicable, and then deeds it back to herself. The deed includes the statement, “This transfer is intended to sever the joint tenancy,” or, in lieu of the words joint tenancy, “... community property with the right of survivorship.”
The wife then prepares a will directing the disposition of her one-half interest in the couple’s community property to someone other than her spouse on her death.
The wife dies, and her estate is probated, conveying her one-half interest in the couple’s real estate as indicated by her will. The husband claims the real estate passes to him under the right of survivorship since the wife’s unilateral deed to herself was ineffective to terminate the right of survivorship.
Did the wife’s deed to herself terminate the right of survivorship?
Yes! Every vested co-owner has the right to unilaterally sever the joint tenancy or community property with right of survivorship vesting which terminates the right of survivorship, whether the interest in the real estate is separate or community property. A co-owner terminating the right of survivorship is not first required to give notice or
A husband and wife are the vested owners of a parcel of real estate which is community property. The vesting provides for the right of survivorship under either a community property with right of survivorship or joint tenancy vesting.
Shortly before her death, the wife is advised the vesting with its right of survivorship means her interest in the property will automatically pass to her husband on her death. The wife wishes to distribute her interest in the property to others by her will. To do so, the wife must terminate the right of survivorship by severing the community property with right of survivorship or joint tenancy vesting. Remember, the property retains its community property status after the severance deed is recorded.
To sever the vesting, the wife prepares and signs a deed from herself “as a joint tenant” or “as community property with right of survivorship,” whichever is applicable, and then deeds it back to herself. The deed includes the statement, “This transfer is intended to sever the joint tenancy,” or, in lieu of the words joint tenancy, “... community property with the right of survivorship.”
The wife then prepares a will directing the disposition of her one-half interest in the couple’s community property to someone other than her spouse on her death.
The wife dies, and her estate is probated, conveying her one-half interest in the couple’s real estate as indicated by her will. The husband claims the real estate passes to him under the right of survivorship since the wife’s unilateral deed to herself was ineffective to terminate the right of survivorship.
Did the wife’s deed to herself terminate the right of survivorship?
Yes! Every vested co-owner has the right to unilaterally sever the joint tenancy or community property with right of survivorship vesting which terminates the right of survivorship, whether the interest in the real estate is separate or community property. A co-owner terminating the right of survivorship is not first required to give notice or
