statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.
(Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 1000.) The court first looks to the words of a statute, “giving the language its usual, ordinary meaning.
If there is no ambiguity in
the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of
the statute governs.” (Ibid., italics added.) “[R]esort to legislative history is appropriate only where statutory language is ambiguous.” (Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v.
Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 29, italics added.)
Here, Sprint identifies no ambiguity in the statute and acknowledges that its literal terms require a telephone company to request a refund with the Board as a prerequisite to filing a judicial tax-refund action.
We must conclude that the legislative intent is reflected in the statute’s
plain language and meaning.